On trade policies and wage disparity in Egypt: Evidence from microeconomic data by Zaki, Chahir
Population Council 
Knowledge Commons 
Poverty, Gender, and Youth Social and Behavioral Science Research (SBSR) 
2011 
On trade policies and wage disparity in Egypt: Evidence from 
microeconomic data 
Chahir Zaki 
Follow this and additional works at: https://knowledgecommons.popcouncil.org/departments_sbsr-pgy 
 Part of the Demography, Population, and Ecology Commons, Family, Life Course, and Society 
Commons, International Public Health Commons, and the Labor Economics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Zaki, Chahir. 2011. "On trade policies and wage disparity in Egypt: Evidence from microeconomic data," 
Gender and Work in the MENA Region Working Paper no. 15. Cairo: Population Council. 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Population Council. 
G E N D E R  A N D  W O R K  I N  T H E  M E N A  R E G I O N  
W O R K I N G  PA P E R  S E R I E S
N U M B E R  15
J U N E  2011
Poverty, Job Quality and Labor Market Dynamics
On Trade Policies and Wage Disparity 
in Egypt:
Evidence from Microeconomic Data
Chahir Zaki
The research presented in this publication is the result of a project funded by Canada’s International 
Development Research Centre (www.idrc.ca).
The Population Council confronts critical health and development issues–from stopping the spread 
of HIV to improving reproductive health and ensuring that young people lead full and productive 
lives. Through biomedical, social science and public health research in 50 countries, the 
Council works with our partners to deliver solutions that lead to more effective policies, programs, 
and technologies to improve lives worldwide. Established in 1952 and headquartered in New York, 
the Council is a nongovernmental, nonprofit organization with an international board of trustees.
Population Council 
Egypt Office
59 Misr Helwan Agricultural Road, Maadi, Cairo, Egypt
Tel.: (+202) 2525-5965, (+202) 2525-5967, (+202) 2525-5968
Facsimile: (+202) 2525-5962
Website: http://www.popcouncil.org
Email: pcouncil@popcouncil.org   
© 2011 The Population Council, Inc.
Any part of this publication may be reproduced without permission for limited distribution, provided 
it is distributed without charge and the Population Council is acknowledged as its source. The 
Population Council would appreciate receiving a copy of any materials in which the text is used.
ISSN: 11869/2011
Chahir Zaki is an Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Political 
Science, Cairo University, and a Research Associate of the Economic Research Forum, Cairo, Egypt. 
Email: chahir_zaki@yahoo.com  
G E N D E R  A N D  W O R K  I N  T H E  M E N A  R E G I O N  
W O R K I N G  PA P E R  S E R I E S
N U M B E R  15
J U N E  2011
Poverty, Job Quality and Labor Market Dynamics
On Trade Policies and Wage Disparity 
in Egypt:






1. Introduction  ................................................................................................................................... 4
2. Some Stylized Facts ......................................................................................................................... 8
2.1  Wage Disparities in Egypt ...................................................................................................... 8
2.2  Trade Liberalization and Facilitation in Egypt  ...................................................................... 14
3. Methodology  ................................................................................................................................ 19
3.1  A One-Step Analysis: the Human Capital Model ................................................................... 19
 3.2  A Two-Step Analysis: The Wage Premia ............................................................................... 20
4. Data  ............................................................................................................................................. 21
4.1  Microeconomic Data: ELMPS 2006 ....................................................................................... 21
4.2  Macroeconomic Data: Trade Policy Variables .........................................................................22
5. Results .......................................................................................................................................... 23
6. Conclusions .................................................................................................................................. 35
Acknowledgment ............................................................................................................................. 37 
References  ....................................................................................................................................... 38
4
Abstract
This paper proposes an empirical investigation of the effect of differ-
ent trade barriers on wages in Egypt. The effect of trade barriers on wage 
disparity has been widely discussed at both empirical and public policy 
levels. This debate mainly dealt with traditional tariff barriers. Less atten-
tion has been attributed to other barriers such as non-tariff measures and 
red tape costs. However, these barriers, and in particular red tape costs, 
are more impeding than tariffs in developing countries. Thus, using a 
microeconomic dataset, I try to assess to what extent different trade bar-
riers affected wage disparity and employment in Egypt. This disparity is 
studied in three dimensions: on gender (males vs. females), qualification 
(blue vs. white collar workers), and regional (urban vs. rural workers). My 
main findings show that both non-tariff measures and red tape barriers 
have a higher impact than traditional tariffs on wage disparity. Women, 
urban workers, and blue collar workers are more affected by such bar-
riers. Finally, when the effects of observable worker characteristics are 
filtered out, it turns out that wage premia are negatively affected by all 
trade barriers.
JEL classification: J01, J16, F15
Keywords: Trade Liberalization, Trade Facilitation, Inequality, Wages, 
Gender.
1. Introduction
The effect of trade barriers on wage disparity has been widely discussed 
at both empirical and public policy levels. This debate mainly dealt with 
traditional tariff barriers. Less attention has been attributed to other 
barriers such as non-tariff measures and red tape costs. However, these 
barriers, and in particular red tape costs, are more impeding than tariffs 
in developing countries. The United Nations Commission on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD, 2001) showed that customs procedures and 
transactions in developing countries involve between 20 to 30 parties, 27 
to 30 stages through many intermediaries, 40 documents, 200 information 
elements of which 30 have to be repeated at least 30 times. Obviously, those 
figures show the magnitude and the cost of administrative barriers. The 
5
removal of such barriers is likely to have a significant impact on imports, 
exports, production, employment, and hence wages. This is why trade 
facilitation seems to be an important process in developing countries. This 
paper assesses the effect of administrative barriers along with tariffs and 
non-tariff measures on wage inequality. Such inequality will be assessed in 
three dimensions: gender (males vs. females), qualification (blue vs. white 
collar workers) and regional (urban vs. rural workers).
Likewise tariffs, administrative barriers induce distortions on the 
market, removing them should affect the allocation of resources and/
or terms of trade and increase the efficiency of the economy. Two main 
frameworks could be evoked. The Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (1933 and 
1941) model was one of the first attempts to determine the effect of trade 
on inequality. According to the Stolper-Samuelson effect, an increase in the 
relative price of a good (where the country has a comparative advantage) 
will lead to a more than proportional increase in the real returns of the 
factor which is intensively used in the production of that good, and 
conversely, to a fall in the real returns of the other factor. Such effects are 
valid when factors are assumed to be mobile between different sectors. 
Yet, inter-sectoral mobility of the factors of production is relatively low in 
the short run. This is why the sector specific model (Viner, 1931) assumes that 
one factor of production is specific to a particular industry. A movement 
towards free trade increases the price of the exportable goods and reduces 
that of importable ones. Hence, the return of the factors used in the 
exporting sectors will increase while factors used in the importing sectors 
will witness a decline of their revenues.
Besides these effects of trade barriers, a couple of remarks are worth 
mentioning with respect to administrative barriers or trade facilitation.1 
First, since these barriers hinder both exports and imports, removing 
red tape costs increases the terms of trade and welfare at the national 
level. Consequently, this will eliminate the anti-export bias as the cost 
of exporting should be lower. This is why, per se, workers in all sectors 
should benefit from such a process, which is not the case in trade 
liberalization. Yet, taking into account the sectoral second-round effects, 
some households may witness higher or lower gains (or eventually losses) 
according to the comparative advantage of the country. Second, trade 
facilitation encompasses investment in public goods, such as transport and 
communications infrastructure that improves the efficiency of the trading 
environment and thus all industries should benefit. A better infrastructure 
greatly enhances households’ welfare, even if they are working in a declining 
1 The definition of such a process splits trade facilitation aspects into four major parts: simplification of com-
mercial procedures; harmonization of trade rules; transparent information and procedures and the recourse to 
new technologies allowing trade promotion (Zaki, 2008).
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sector. Considering these two points, the impact of trade facilitation is 
likely to be higher than that of trade liberalization. Moreover, while trade 
facilitation may amplify the positive effects of trade liberalization, it may 
also attenuate its negative effects thanks to the effects mentioned above.
The empirical literature on trade and wage inequality is quite rich but 
has never considered red tape barriers.2 This literature can be classified 
in four main groups. The first one assesses the effect of trade barriers 
on wage inequality and wage premia in general. Some seminal works 
could be cited like Gaston and Trefler (1994) who found, for the USA, 
a statistically significant negative effect of tariffs on relative wages and 
wage premia. Goh and Javorcik (2005) showed that in Poland, workers in 
sectors with the largest tariff declines experienced the highest increase 
in wages. In India, these workers suffered the highest relative decrease 
in wage premia (Dutta, 2007). Said and El Azzawi (2009) examined those 
issues in Egypt and found that export promotion had the most important 
effect on wage premia. That is why trade barriers may have a positive or 
negative effect on wages. The reason behind such different results depend 
upon the protection and the trade structure. Since barriers represent a 
distortion on the market, they are associated with an inefficiency and a 
lower productivity and hence lower wages. By contrast, as they protect 
workers from foreign competition, they result in higher wages.
The second group determined the relationship between trade policies 
and skill premium. Bontout and Jean (1998) showed, using a computable 
general equilibrium model, that sector-biased technical change and 
North-North trade can significantly increase skilled labor’s relative wages. 
Moreover, Feenstra and Hanson (2001) developed a theoretical model 
showing that trade in inputs has the same impact on labor demand as does 
skill-biased technical change since both of these will shift demand away 
from low-skilled activities and raise the relative demand and wages of the 
better-skilled. Meschi et al. (2009) found in Turkey that firms belonging 
to the sectors that increased their imported inputs from more developed 
countries witnessed a higher increase in their share of skilled workers. 
While Blom et al. (2004) concluded that trade liberalization in Brazil did 
not significantly contribute to increased wage inequality between the 
skilled and unskilled workers through changes in industry wage premia, 
Araújo et al. (2009) showed that Brazilian manufacturing firms raised 
their imports of capital goods involving a skill-biased technological change 
in this sector. Finally, Attanasio et al. (2004) proved that, in Colombia, 
the increase in the skill premium has been driven by skilled-biased 
technological change thanks to drastic liberalization.
2 For an extensive literature review, see Goldberg and Pavnick (2007b)
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The third group encompasses studies that assessed the effect of trade 
barriers on regional inequality. Puga (1999), Puga and Venables (1999), 
and Sutton (2002) examined the determinants of firms agglomeration 
and their effects on wage inequality. Paluzie (2001) found that regional 
inequality rises as international trade in manufacturing increases. Nicita 
(2004) found that, in Mexico, trade liberalization has contributed to an 
increase in inequality between the south and the north of the country, 
urban and rural areas, and skilled and unskilled labor. While Goldberg and 
Pavnick (2007a) failed to find evidence between the trade reforms and 
the changes in urban poverty in Colombia, Topalova (2005) showed that 
the decline in tariffs as a result of the sharp trade liberalization appears 
to have led to a relative increase in the poverty rate and poverty gap in 
districts of which exposure to liberalization was more intense.3
Finally, the fourth group includes studies that focused on the link 
between trade and gender inequality. Among the very first studies, Becker 
(1971) showed that, theoretically, free trade implies a more competitive 
environment and, consequently, a less discriminating economy. 
Artecona and Cunningham (2002) found that the gender wage gap fell 
in the industries that were forced to become competitive due to trade 
liberalization. Similarly, Klein et al. (2010) proved that an increase in 
exports increases wage inequality along the dimension of skill but in the 
mean time it reduces the wage inequality associated with gender and 
nationality differences. In Mexico, Aguayo-Tellez et al. (2010) found that 
the relative wages of women remained stable while employment increased, 
leading to an increase in their wage bill share.
In the case of Egypt, existing work has pointed out to persistent 
inequalities at these different levels. At the regional level, Said (2007) showed 
that living outside greater Cairo is associated with a wage disadvantage for 
all sector and gender groups. Concerning gender inequality, Said (2007) 
also found that, after correcting for productivity differences, the gap in 
favor of females is only 3% in government sectors and the one in favor of 
males is 21% in the private sector. El Hamidi (2008) argued that, during 
trade liberalization periods, the tradables sector experienced higher wage 
gaps between males and females than the non-tradables sector. Yet, the 
effect of trade policies and the skill premium has never been studied in 
the Egyptian case.
In all of these studies, red tape barriers were never considered despite 
their highly negative impact. Therefore, this paper seeks to take a first 
3 The difference between the two papers lies in the liberalization of the agricultural sector that may have a 
significant effect on poverty in the short and medium run. While India experienced significant tariff reductions 
in the agricultural sector, agricultural trade liberalization in Colombia was limited. This is why Colombian poor 
in rural areas were not affected by the liberalization waves.
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step toward assessing the effect of different trade barriers on wages in 
Egypt. Being more affected by trade policies, I select wage inequality (real 
hourly wage) rather than income inequality in order to assess the effect 
of different barriers.4 This paper has two contributions. First, traditional 
tariffs, non-tariff measures and red tape barriers are simultaneously taken 
into account. Second, disparity is studied in three dimensions: gender 
(males vs. females), qualification (skilled vs. unskilled), and regional (urban 
vs. rural workers). This is why this paper combines both microeconomic 
(Egyptian Labor Market Panel Survey, 2006) and macroeconomic (for 
different types of barriers) datasets. The ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) of 
red tape costs are estimated in a companion paper (Zaki, 2009).
The main findings show that non-tariff measures as well as red tape 
barriers have a higher impact than classic tariffs on wage disparity. 
Females, urban workers, and blue collar workers are more affected by such 
barriers. Finally, when the effects of observable worker characteristics are 
filtered out, it turns out that wage premia are negatively affected by all 
trade barriers.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents some stylized 
facts regarding wage disparities. It also gives the main liberalization and 
facilitation changes that took place in the Egyptian economy. Section 3 
displays the methodology. Section 4 is devoted to the data presentation. 
Section 5 presents the main results and Section 6 concludes.
2. Some Stylized Facts
2.1  Wage Disparities in Egypt
Wage disparities remain a serious issue in Egypt. Such disparity is 
observed at many levels: gender, qualification, and geography. According 
to the World Bank (2005), the Gini index in Egypt is 32.1. More precisely, 
the income share held by the lowest 10% of the population is 3.7% and the 
one held by the lowest 20% is 9%. Those figures are much higher for the 
highest 20% and 10% (44% and 30% respectively).
Although the situation for women has improved significantly, they still 
earn less than men. Yet, as mentioned by Said (2007), the female relative 
4 According to Milanovic and Squire (2007), the link between policy reforms and wage inequality is likely 
to be stronger than the link between policy reforms and inequality in total income. The latter is affected by a 
number of other institutional factors such as the role of social transfers (pension spending or family benefits), 
demographics of the population and labor force participation. By contrast, wage inequality does not depend on 
such factors. Thus, the link between trade policy and wages must be stronger than that between trade policy 
and the distribution of total income.
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rewards witnessed larger real wage improvements in comparison to their 
male counterparts between 1998 and 2006 (the gap in favor of females is 
only 3% in government sectors and the one in favor of males is 21% in the 
private sector). This is thanks to the fact that women are concentrated 
in the government sector that guarantees stability, suitable revenues, 
flexible maternity leave, and not requiring much time. In this sector, real 
wages increased by 40% as opposed to only 17% in the private sector. 
In addition, by observing the most important sectors intensive in female 
labor, textiles and garments, retail and trade; and education and health 
rank first. In particular, textiles and garments are witnessing a significant 
openness at both national and international levels. At the national level, 
import prohibitions were lifted on most textile and clothing products in 
2004, through the ministerial decree 161/2004. Meanwhile, the imports of 
some products are subject to specific administrative formalities, inducing 
additional red tape costs. Even though quotas seem to have no effect on 
Egyptian trade, the trade facilitation issues still hinder some imports 
as well as exports. At the international level, the dismantlement of the 
Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA) in January 2005 has put an end to all quota 
barriers impeding the textiles and garments trade. Consequently, Egypt 
should face a fierce competition coming from other countries, especially 
in Asia, whose exports are much more competitive. This, in turn, could 
have a negative effect on Egyptian exports, employment, wages, and hence 
inequality.
As shown in Table 1, males are distributed in different manufacturing 
sectors while females are mainly working in textile, garments, and food. 
Therefore, garments liberalization means more trade, higher expansion, 
and greater wages for females who are working in these sectors. Table 2 
shows that almost all the manufacturing sectors (except garments) are 
more intensive in males than females. Females represent only some 13% of 
the labor force in the manufacturing sector in Egypt.
 Table  1: Distribution of Labor in Manufacturing: By Gender, Qualification and Regions, 20
 Males Females  Urban  Rural Unskilled Skilled  Total 
Food and Beverage 19.1%  18.0%  16.6%  23.6%  19.0%  18.9%  19.0% 
Tobacco  0.7%  0.7%  0.9%  0.3%  0.5%  1.3%  0.7% 
Textiles  9.8%  14.0%  10.6%  10.0%  10.4%  10.3%  10.4% 
Garment  6.5%  39.3%  12.6%  7.0%  12.5%  5.6%  10.7% 
Leather Goods  2.0%  4.0%  3.0%  1.0%  3.0%  0.3%  2.3% 
Wood Product 
(except furniture)  3.0%  0.7%  1.9%  4.3%  3.7%  0.0%  2.7% 
continued u
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Paper  1.8%  1.3%  1.7%  1.8%  1.9%  1.0%  1.7% 
Publishing and 
Printing  3.4%  2.0%  3.7%  2.3%  2.4%  5.6%  3.2% 
Coke and Petroleum 
Products  4.6%  4.0%  5.5%  2.5%  2.4%  10.6%  4.5% 
Chemical Product  7.3%  8.7%  9.7%  3.3%  6.1%  11.6%  7.5% 
Rubber Product  1.2%  0.0%  0.8%  1.5%  1.0%  1.0%  1.0% 
Non-metallic 
Mineral  9.6%  1.3%  6.7%  12.0%  9.3%  6.3%  8.5% 
Basic Metal  2.6%  0.7%  2.4%  2.3%  2.1%  3.3%  2.4% 
Metallic Product  7.5%  0.0%  7.5%  4.8%  7.2%  4.7%  6.5% 
Machinery and 
Equipment  5.1%  1.3%  5.5%  2.8%  2.6%  10.3%  4.6% 
Electrical 
Equipment  0.5%  1.3%  0.5%  0.8%  0.3%  1.3%  0.6% 
Radio, TV,  and Com. 
Equip.  0.9%  0.7%  1.0%  0.5%  0.1%  3.0%  0.9% 
Medical Equipment  0.3%  1.3%  0.6%  0.0%  0.1%  1.3%  0.4% 
Other Transport 
Equipment  0.6%  0.7%  0.8%  0.3%  0.2%  1.7%  0.6% 
Furniture 13.5%  0.0%  8.0%  19.3%  15.3%  1.7%  11.8% 
Total  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
Source: Constructed by the author from ELMPS, 2006. 
Table  2: Distribution of Labor in Manufacturing: By Gender, Qualification and Regions, 2006 
 Males Females  Urban  Rural Unskilled  Skilled  Total 
Food and 
Beverage  87.9%  12.1%  57.9%  42.2%  74.4%  25.6% 100.0% 
Tobacco  87.5%  12.5%  87.5%  12.5%  50.0%  50.0% 100.0% 
Textiles  82.8%  17.2%  67.2%  32.8%  74.6%  25.4% 100.0% 
Garment  53.2%  46.8%  77.8%  22.2%  86.5%  13.5% 100.0% 
Leather Goods  77.8%  22.2%  85.2%  14.8%  96.3%  3.7% 100.0% 
Wood Product 
(expt Furniture)  96.9%  3.1%  46.9%  53.1%  100.0%  0.0% 100.0% 
Paper  90.0%  10.0%  65.0%  35.0%  85.0%  15.0% 100.0% 
Publishing and 
Printing  92.1%  7.9%  76.3%  23.7%  55.3%  44.7% 100.0% 
Coke and Petro. 




Product  85.2%  14.8%  85.2%  14.8%  60.2%  39.8% 100.0% 
Rubber Product  100.0%  0.0%  50.0%  50.0%  75.0%  25.0% 100.0% 
Non-metallic 
Mineral  98.0%  2.0%  52.0%  48.0%  81.0%  19.0% 100.0% 
Basic Metal  96.4%  3.6%  67.9%  32.1%  64.3%  35.7% 100.0% 
Metallic Product  100.0%  0.0%  75.3%  24.7%  81.8%  18.2% 100.0% 
Machinery and 
Equipment  96.3%  3.7%  79.6%  20.4%  42.6%  57.4% 100.0% 
Electrical 
Equipment  71.4%  28.6%  57.1%  42.9%  42.9%  57.1% 100.0% 
Radio, TV,  and 
Com. Equip.  90.0%  10.0%  80.0%  20.0%  10.0%  90.0% 100.0% 
Medical 
Equipment  60.0%  40.0%  100.0%  0.0%  20.0%  80.0% 100.0% 
Other Transport 
Equipment  85.7%  14.3%  85.7%  14.3%  28.6%  71.4% 100.0% 
Furniture  100.0%  0.0%  44.6%  55.4%  96.4%  3.6% 100.0% 
Total  87.2%  12.8%  66.1%  33.9%  74.4%  25.6% 100.0% 
Source: Constructed by the author from ELMPS, 2006.
Regarding geographical inequality, urban areas and especially Greater 
Cairo represent a center attracting firms and educated persons to the 
detriment of other governorates.5 Thus, workers in the latter will earn less 
than in the former. Said (2007) showed that living outside greater Cairo is 
associated with a wage disadvantage for all sector and gender groups. Many 
efforts have been deployed to reverse these trends in 1990 and succeeded 
to reduce such disadvantage in 2006, but according to her findings, urban 
and rural lower Egypt areas still suffer from the greatest disadvantage. 
Table 1 shows that the distribution of urban and rural workers is the same 
in different sectors except food and furniture where rural persons are 
mainly working. Yet, Table 2 points out the fact that urban employment 
represents 66% of the labor force in the manufacturing sector. Almost all 
sectors are more intensive in urban workers than rural ones. This shows to 
what extent the geographical location may affect employment and wages.
Finally, I distinguish skilled and unskilled workers according to 
their occupation. While the former are white collar workers (technical 
and scientific; managers; clerical; sales and services), the latter are blue 
collar workers (agriculture and production workers).6 Having a look on 
5 Egypt is divided into 29 governorates.
6 For the sake of robustness check, skilled and unskilled workers have been distinguished on the 
basis of their education levels. It turns out that figures do not change.
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qualification in different sectors, it is quite clear that garments, textiles, 
food and beverages, and furniture are intensive in unskilled labor while 
machinery and equipment are more intensive in skilled ones. Unskilled 
employment represents 75% of the labor force in the manufacturing sector.
Combining these three criterion together (i.e. gender, qualification, 
and region), Table 3 displays the number of workers by segment and by 
sector. The majority of unskilled females are working in garments (50.5% 
and 43% in urban and rural areas respectively). Concerning males, skilled 
ones in urban areas work mainly in machinery, chemicals, and food (12.2%, 
13.1%, and 18.8% respectively).
Table  3: Employment by Sector and by Segment, 2006
   Males  Females  
 Skilled  Unskilled  Skilled  Unskilled  
Urban  Rural Urban  Rural Urban  Rural Urban  Rural  Total 
Food and Beverage  40  11  76  69  5  1  8  13  223 
Tobacco  3  0  3  1  1  0  0  0  8 
Textiles  16  8  49  28  7  0  10  4  122 
Garment  8  0  47  12  8  1  35  15  126 
Leather  1  0  17  3  0  0  5  1  27 
Wood Prod. (except 
Furniture)  0  0  15  16  0  0  0  1  32 
Paper  3  0  8  7  0  0  2  0  20 
Publishing and 
Printing  10  4  16  5  3  0  0  0  38 
Coke and Petro. Prod.  23  3  15  6  5  1  0  0  53 
Chemical Prod.  28  1  35  11  6  0  6  1  88 
Rubber Prod.  2  1  4  5  0  0  0  0  12 
Non-metallic Mineral  17  0  33  48  2  0  0  0  100 
Basic Metal  7  2  11  7  1  0  0  0  28 
Metallic Prod.  12  2  46  17  0  0  0  0  77 
Machinery and  26  4  15  7  1  0  1  0  54 
Electrical Equip. 
(Other)  1  2  1  1  1  0  1  0  7 
Radio, TV, and Com. 
Equip.  7  1  0  1  1  0  0  0  10 
Medical \Equip.  2  0  1  0  2  0  0  0  5 
Other Transport 
Equip.  3  1  2  0  1  0  0  0  7 
Furniture  4  1  58  76  0  0  0  0  139 
Total  213  41  452  320  44  3  68  35  1176 
Source: Constructed by the author from ELMPS, 2006.
13
In summary, all sectors are mainly intensive in urban and blue collar 
workers. Therefore, trade facilitation and liberalization will primarily 
benefit these workers as it is shown in Table 4.
Table  4: Employment by Sector and by Segment, 2006
   Males  Females  RCA 
 White Collar  Blue Collar  White Collar  Blue Collar   
Urban  Rural Urban  Rural Urban  Rural Urban  Rural   
Coke and Petro. 
Prod. 43.4%  5.7% 28.3% 11.3%  9.4%  1.9%  0.0%  0.0%  25.44 
Non-metallic 
Mineral 17.0%  0.0% 33.0% 48.0%  2.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  3.97 
Basic Metal 25.0%  7.1% 39.3% 25.0%  3.6%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  3.47 
Garment  6.3%  0.0% 37.3%  9.5%  6.3%  0.8% 27.8% 11.9%  3.09 
Textiles 13.1%  6.6% 40.2% 23.0%  5.7%  0.0%  8.2%  3.3%  2.86 
Leather Goods  3.7%  0.0% 63.0% 11.1%  0.0%  0.0% 18.5%  3.7%  1.01 
Food and Beverage 17.9%  4.9% 34.1% 30.9%  2.2%  0.4%  3.6%  5.8%  0.92 
Chemical Product 31.8%  1.1% 39.8% 12.5%  6.8%  0.0%  6.8%  1.1%  0.69 
Furniture  2.9%  0.7% 41.7% 54.7%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.65 
Rubber Product 16.7%  8.3% 33.3% 41.7%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.57 
Tobacco 37.5%  0.0% 37.5% 12.5% 12.5%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.53 
Metallic Prod. 15.6%  2.6% 59.7% 22.1%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.52 
Publishing and 
Printing 26.3% 10.5% 42.1% 13.2%  7.9%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.49 
Paper 15.0%  0.0% 40.0% 35.0%  0.0%  0.0% 10.0%  0.0%  0.47 
Wood Product  0.0%  0.0% 46.9% 50.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  3.1%  0.26 
Radio, TV, and Com. 
Equip. 70.0% 10.0%  0.0% 10.0% 10.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.24 
Machine and Equip. 48.1%  7.4% 27.8% 13.0%  1.9%  0.0%  1.9%  0.0%  0.14 
Electrical Equip. 14.3% 28.6% 14.3% 14.3% 14.3%  0.0% 14.3%  0.0%  0.13 
Medical Equip. 40.0%  0.0% 20.0%  0.0% 40.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.13 
Other Transp. Equip. 42.9% 14.3% 28.6%  0.0% 14.3%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.10 
Source: Constructed by the author from ELMPS, 2006. 
After observing the labor market characteristics, Table 5 shows the 
wages landscape for each segment in Egypt. Since the median is a more 
robust measure of central tendency than mean, I will stick to the median 
of wages for each segment. The median of wages for women is always 
lower than their male counterparts. The highest median wage is the one of 
urban skilled males followed by rural skilled males, urban skilled females, 
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and urban unskilled males. On the other extreme, the lowest median wage 
is the one of rural skilled females, urban and rural unskilled females, and 
rural unskilled males. Such an analysis shows that being a female, unskilled, 
or a rural workers reduces one’s wage. Interestingly, the effect of being a 
female reduces wages more since urban unskilled males are more paid than 
urban skilled females.
Table 5: Wages by Segment, 2006  
 
  Workers  Wages 
 
 Number  Share  Mean Median 
 Std 
Dev  Min  Max 
 Males  Skilled Urban 213 18.11% 5.59 3.12 10.91 0.80 137.88
   Rural 41 3.49% 2.59 2.18 1.48 0.50 7.05
Unskilled Urban 452 38.44% 2.81 1.92 4.95 0.27 76.70
  Rural 320 27.21% 2.15 1.80 1.73 0.38 22.25
Females Skilled Urban 44 3.74% 3.25 2.14 3.87 0.27 23.08
   Rural 3 0.26% 13.64 0.86 22.16 0.83 39.23
 Unskilled Urban 68 5.78% 2.98 0.96 10.72 0.23 86.67
   Rural 35 2.98% 3.41 1.00 8.44 0.60 48.27
 Total   1176 100.00% 3.20 2.00 6.59 0.23 137.88
Source: Constructed by the author from ELMPS, 2006. 
Bearing in mind these facts regarding the major characteristics of 
labor and wage disparity, it is worth finding to what extent trade policy 
affects wage disparities in Egypt. That is why I will present the main 
characteristics of Egyptian trade policy.
2.2  Trade Liberalization and Facilitation in Egypt
Since the beginning of the 1990’s, Egypt, witnessing both macro 
and microeconomic changes, has undertaken many trade liberalization 
policies, in particular through the Economic Reform and Structural 
Adjustment Program (ERSAP).7 The latter aimed at increasing the private 
sector participation, opening the economy, privatizing some state owned 
firms and hence beginning the transition to a market economy. That is why 
Egypt’s trade has increased significantly between 1990 and 2006 thanks to 
an important decline in tariffs. However, non-tariff measures as well as red 
tape barriers are still impeding trade as it will be shown below.
7 For more details about the ERSAP effect, see Korayem (1997).
15
Over two decades, Egypt has significantly liberalized its external trade. 
The maximum tariff rate has decreased from 110% at the end of the 1980’s 
to reach 40% in the end of 1990’s. In 2004, the government of Egypt 
launched the second wave of liberalization. Its objectives were twofold: 
first, to reduce tariffs and rationalize the tariff structure; and second, to 
reduce the number of products subject to non-tariff barriers. The number 
of tariff bands was narrowed from 27 tariff brackets to 6, tariff dispersion 
measured by standard deviation declined from 16.1 in 2000 to 12.7 in 
2004 and tariff lines were reduced from 8,000 to 6,000. Both nominal 
and effective protection have declined in the manufacturing sector from 
21.3% to 12.1% and from 23.3% to 14% respectively after the 2004 reform. 
All those measures should in turn simplify procedures, minimize tariff 
evasion, and remove possibilities of discretion and corruption. Figure 1 
presents tariffs structure in manufacturing sectors. It is quite clear that 
tobacco, garments, and leather products have a high tariff rate while paper 
manufacturing, basic metal, and transport equipment are characterized by 
a low protection.
Figure 1: Tariff Barriers in Egypt  
 
Source: Constructed by the author from the World Tariff Profile.
Note: Figures show the ad valorem applied tariffs in percentage.
Having a glance on non-tariff measures, the picture is not the same. 
Figure 2 displays the frequency index of non-tariff measures in Egypt 
coming from the “Trade and Production dataset.” Food, beverages, 
textiles, garments, and machinery suffer more than other sectors from 
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such measures since they are subject to many sanitary and phyto-sanitary 
measures and technical barriers to trade.
Figure 2: Non-Tariff Barriers in Egypt
 Source: Constructed by the author from the Trade and Production dataset.
Note: Figures show the frequency index of non-tariff measures (scaled from 0 to 1. The higher the value of the 
index, the more frequent the non-tariff measures). 
Apart from the traditional tariff and non-tariff barriers, red tape 
procedures for exports and imports remain high and costly in Egypt. In 
2007, export procedures need 20 days costing U.S.$ 1,014 and import ones 
need 25 days adding some U.S.$ 1,049 to the value of imported goods. 
Yet, between 2006 and 2009, the number of documents to be filed for 
exports and imports decreased from 8 to 6 documents. The same pattern 
is observed for time since the number of days to export has fallen from 27 
to 15 and from 29 to 18 for imports. Egypt still has a long way to go to reach 
better rankings in the ease of doing business or best practise countries in 
trade facilitation aspects. That is why such administrative barriers should 
obviously have an impact on wages like tariff barriers or even more. To 
better assess the effect of such barriers, I have estimated the ad valorem 
equivalent (AVEs) of such barriers in Zaki (2009). Those AVEs take into 
account the effect of bureaucracy, internet, corruption and geographical 
impediments on the time to export and to import. Figures 3 and 4 display 
those AVEs. Perishable (food), seasonal (textiles and garments), and high 
value added products (medical equipment and machinery) have higher 
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AVEs than tobacco, coke, or wood products that are not sensitive to the 
transaction time of trade.
Figure 3: Ad Valorem Equivalent of Time to Import   
 
Source: Constructed by the author.
Note: Figures show the estimated ad valorem equivalent of time to import in percentage. 
Figure 4: Ad Valorem Equivalent of Time to Export
 
Source: Constructed by the author.
Note: Figures show the estimated ad valorem equivalent of time to export in percentage.
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To determine which workers will be affected by trade facilitation or 
trade liberalization, it is important to have a view of the sectors where Egypt 
has a comparative advantage. As it was mentioned before, according to 
the sector specific model, individuals working in exporting sectors should 
benefit since their wages increase. Similarly, the ``Stolper-Samuelson’’ 
model predicts that workers employed in the sectors where a country has 
a comparative advantage experience an increase of their wages. Figure 5 
shows the revealed comparative advantage index for Egypt. The latter has 
a high comparative advantage in non-metallic products, metals, textiles, 
and garments. Individuals working these sectors should experience an 
increase in their wages once trade is facilitated or liberalized.
Figure 5: Revealed Comparative Advantage in Egypt    
 
Source: Constructed by the author from Trade and Production. 













 where ijX  and iwX  are the values of country j ’s exports of product i  and 
world exports of product i  and where ji
X∑  and wiX∑  refer to the country j ’s total exports and 
world total exports. A value of less than unity implies that the country has a revealed comparative disadvantage 
in the product. If the index is higher than unity, the country has a revealed comparative advantage in the product.
19
After analyzing trade policy issues, it is worth giving a brief idea about 
the Egyptian labor market in order to find the nexus between trade policies 
and inequality. Table 6 shows that, between 1998 and 2006, the share of 
individuals working in the  manufacturing sector has increased from 7.7% 
to 8.7%. Agriculture share increased also with a similar pattern as industry. 
Finally, being the most important employer in Egypt, the share of services 
has significantly increased from 26.4% to 36%. Our focus will be only on 
the manufacturing sector because it has witnessed the most important 
liberalization during the last decade.
Table  6: Distribution of Labor in Different Sectors, 2006  
Economic Activity  1998 (%)  2006 (%)
Agriculture and Fishing  6.34  8.62 
Mining, Manufacturing  7.66  8.67 
Construction  2.75  3.76 
Wholesale, Hotels, and Restaurants.  6.53  10.87 
Transportation, Storage and Communication  2.85  3.94 
Financial & Business Activities  0.95  1.75 
Public Service  13.29  15.73 
Other Econ. Activities.  2.48  1.73 
Other Status (Unemployment, out of Labor Force)  57.15  44.93
Total  100  100
Source: Constructed by the author from ELMPS, 2006. 
Taking all those barriers into account, their effect should not be 
inconsequential on trade, employment, and therefore on wage disparity.
3. Methodology
3.1  A One-Step Analysis: the Human Capital Model
To directly assess the effect of trade policy on wage disparity, I use 
the human capital model (Mincer, 1974) to which different trade barriers 
are added. The natural logarithm of real hourly wage8 )( igswLog  of 
individual i  living in region g  and working in sector s  is regressed on 
8 Hourly real wages are calculated as the sum of wages earned in the reference month from primary jobs, 
adjusted for average number of work days per month and average hours per day.
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individual characteristics (education attainment and experience), other 
dummies capturing some specific individual if  (membership in a trade 
union, working in the public sector or being a production worker), and 
regional gf  characteristics and different trade policy variables (tariffs 
sTar , non-tariff measures sNTM , the AVEs of the time to export sTimX  
and that to import sTimM  capturing the effect of red tape costs). It is also 
important to include industry indicators that control for non-observable 
industry characteristics isα . The coefficient on the industry dummy, the 
wage premium, captures the part of the variation in wages that cannot 
be explained by worker characteristics, but explained by the workers’ 
industry affiliation.
 (1)
with igsε  the discrepancy term.
3.2  A Two-Step Analysis: The Wage Premia
In order to determine the impact of different trade barriers on wage 
premia, we have to run first the previous model without including trade 
barriers in it and then retrieve industry effects to be explained by trade 
barriers in a later stage. In other words, my first step will be as follows:
            (2)
As per the second step, according to Attanasio et al. (2004),9 since 
industry wage premia  are obtained by filtering out the effects of 
observable worker characteristics, they are regressed on a vector of trade 
policy variables, namely tariffs sTar , non-tariff measures sNTM , the 
AVEs of time to export sTimX  and that to import sTimM  as follows:
   (3)
9 For more details about the wage premium estimation, see Gaston and Trefler (1994), Attanasio et al (2004), 
Dutta (2007), and Said and El Azzawi (2009)
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Therefore, it is possible to determine the effect of each barrier on the 
inter-industry wage premium.10
Before presenting the data and the results, it is worth mentioning 
that one could expect that workers in an industry with high tariffs, non-
tariff measures, or red tape impediments are paid less than workers with 
identical characteristics in an industry with low tariffs. Heavily protected 
industries that are less productive employ also less productive workers 
who should earn lower wages. Thus, trade reform affects industry-level 
productivity which in turn boosts wages in these sectors thanks to trade 
liberalization or facilitation.
4. Data
4.1  Microeconomic Data: ELMPS 2006
Data used in this study are obtained from different sources. First, 
regarding microeconomic data,the Egyptian Labor Market Panel Survey 
(ELMPS 2006) is used. The latter is a nationally-representative household 
survey that consists of a total of 8,349 households distributed as follows: 
a total of 3,684 households followed since the Egyptian Labor Market 
Survey 1998, 2,176 new households that split from these households and a 
refresher sample consisting of 2,498 households was also included to ensure 
that the data continue to be nationally-representative after the split of 
some households that were present in 1998. Both surveys’ questionnaires 
(Barssoum, 2007) are composed of three major sections: (1) a household 
questionnaire administered to the head of household or the head’s 
spouse that contains information on basic demographic characteristics 
of household members, movement of household members in and out 
of the household since 1998, ownership of durable goods and assets, 
and housing conditions, (2) an individual questionnaire administered to 
10 To remedy for the sensitivity of the estimated wage premia with respect to the omitted industry dummy, 
I follow Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt (1997) that have calculated the wage premia as deviations from an 
employment weighted mean as follows 
                      (4)
where   is the normalized wage differentials,   is an identity matrix and   is a matrix of industry
employment weights with each element   , where    is the number of workers in industry  .
Thus, equation 3 is estimated using the normalized wage differentials not the estimated ones.
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the individual containing information on parental background, detailed 
education histories, activity status, job search and unemployment, detailed 
employment characteristics, a module on women’s work, migration 
histories, job histories, time use, earnings, and fertility. (3) A household 
enterprise and income module that elicits information on all agricultural 
and non-agricultural enterprises operated by the household as well as all 
income sources, including remittances and transfers.
My sample is restricted to individuals who are in the working 
age, between 15 and 64 years old. Only those who are working in the 
manufacturing sector are taken into account with some 1,176 individuals 
distributed among 20 manufacturing sectors11 as it is shown in Table 1.
4.2  Macroeconomic Data: Trade Policy Variables
Trade policy variables have different sources. First, tariff data come 
from the World Trade Organization Tariffs Profile based on the Egyptian 
customs authority data. Those figures are applied tariffs in 2005 at the 2 
digits level.
Second, non-tariff measures come from the CEPII’s12 “Trade and 
Production” database that includes the frequency of many non-tariff 
barriers such as the frequency of quotas, sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures, technical barriers to trade, etc.
Finally, I use the AVEs of the administrative barriers that have been 
estimated in Zaki (2009)13 through a theoretical gravity model using the 
Doing Business dataset (World Bank, 2007). Those estimations are made 
for the time to export and to import using a bunch of administrative 
barriers, namely bureaucracy, internet, corruption, and geographical 
impediments (being landlocked or an island). This is why such AVEs can 
be perceived as an exhaustive measure of red tape costs.
11 Those sectors are: food and beverages, tobacco, textiles, garments, leather goods, wood products, paper, 
publishing, coke and petroleum, chemical products, rubber products, non-metallic substances, basic metal, 
metallic products, machinery and equipment, electrical equipment, radio and television, medical equipment, 
transport equipment, and furniture
12 Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales. They are available on CEPII’s website.
13 To estimate the tariff equivalent of non-tariff and administrative barriers, the methodology of Olarreaga et 
al (2009) has been used.
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5. Results
Results are organized in three parts. First, I will try to determine to 
what extent trade barriers differently affect males vs. females, urban 
vs. rural workers, and blue vs. white collar workers. Moreover, quantile 
regressions, that are more robust to large outliers, are run to assess the 
effect of trade policy on different wage quantiles. Second, the effect of 
trade barriers on wage premia and on employment will be discussed. 
Finally, some sensitivity analysis will be presented.
The human capital model (Mincer, 1974) performs quite well since 
the findings are consistent with the classical results of the Mincerian 
equation. Experience has a positive effect and experience squared has a 
negative effect on wages. The more an individual is educated (captured 
by the number of years of schooling), the higher he earns. Living outside 
Greater Cairo (rural and urban regions in upper and lower Egypt) reduces 
income significantly. This in turn shows to what extent geographical 
disparities are a crucial issue in Egypt. Being a member of a trade union 
is likely to increase the real hourly wage since firms may be willing to pay 
higher wages if there is a viable threat of collective action. By contrast, 
a production worker earns less than a non-production one since the 
coefficient associated with the fact of being a blue collar worker is negative 
and statistically significant. Finally, working in the public sector or being a 
female does not affect wages.
Moving to trade policy variables, tariffs and red tape costs have a 
negative impact on all workers as it is presented in Column 1 in Table 7. 
Workers in industries characterized by a high protection are paid less than 
workers with identical characteristics in an industry with low protection. 
Since tariffs and administrative barriers induce distortions on the market, 
they reduce the efficiency and the productivity of firms and thus reduce 
wages. This is why, once tariffs and red tape costs are eliminated, wages 
should increase. By contrast, non-tariff measures have a positive effect on 
all workers. This result is similar to what Jean and Nicoletti (2002) found 
for the effect of non-tariff barriers on relative wages in OECD countries. 
This can be explained by the fact that the lack of competition from 
imports due to high non-tariff barriers raises the demand for labor, which 
in turn raises wages. Column 2 shows that the interaction between being 
a female and the different barriers is also significant. Thus, females suffer 
more than males from trade protection. First, tariffs seem to have a highly 
significant and negative effect on females’ wages. Moreover, and even 
more importantly, administrative barriers to trade, especially the time to 
export, have also a significant and negative effect on females. Column 3 
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displays the effect on males only.14 While non-tariff measures do not affect 
males’ wages, both tariffs and red tape costs have a negative impact on 
their wages.
As per the regional level, while rural workers are more affected only 
by tariffs and the time to export, urban ones bear the cost of protection 
arising from all the barriers because tariffs, non-tariff measures and red 
tape costs have a negative effect on their wages. Hence, trade facilitation 
or liberalization should make urban workers better-off. By contrast, given 
the fact that the majority of rural individuals are working in the agriculture 
sector where Egypt does not have a comparative advantage, once trade 
is opened, farmers should be negatively affected which increase the gap 
between rural and urban workers.
Table 7: Trade Policy and Wages by Gender
   1  2  3 
 All  All  Males 
 Ln (Hr. Wage)  Ln (Hr. Wage)  Ln (Hr. Wage) 
 Tariff  -0.00701***  0.000610 -0.00593*** 
 (0.000769)  (0.00158)  (0.000857) 
Non Tariff  0.0922***  0.0814  -2.49e-05 
 (0.0198)  (0.0492)  (0.0174) 
AVE Time Exp  -0.0118***  -0.00640** -0.00843*** 
 (0.00240)  (0.00241)  (0.00182) 
AVE Time Imp  -0.00376***  -0.00322* -0.00521*** 
 (0.000392)  (0.00156)  (0.000459) 
Public  0.0211  0.0204  0.00537 
 (0.0416)  (0.0432)  (0.0441) 
Experience  0.0370***  0.0368***  0.0360*** 
 (0.00577)  (0.00557)  (0.00624) 
Experience2. -0.000406*** -0.000395*** -0.000377** 
 (0.000132)  (0.000128)  (0.000138) 
Years of Schooling  0.0261***  0.0277***  0.0279*** 
 (0.00603)  (0.00590)  (0.00663) 
Trade Union  0.394***  0.390***  0.372*** 
 (0.0512)  (0.0501)  (0.0624) 
Not Cairo  -0.120**  -0.122***  -0.131*** 
 (0.0427)  (0.0424)  (0.0433) 
Blue Collar  -0.133***  -0.131**  -0.158*** 




 (0.0461)  (0.0466)  (0.0540) 
Female  -0.166  0.455  
 (0.132)  (0.307)  
Female*AVE TE   -0.0525***  
  (0.0148)  
Female*AVE TM   -0.00413  
  (0.0114)  
Female*Tariff   -0.0329***  
  (0.00769)  
Female*NTB   0.542**  
  (0.220)  
Constant  0.295***  0.120  0.320** 
 (0.0943)  (0.100)  (0.124) 
Industry Dummies  YES  YES  YES 
 Observations  1176  1176  1026 
R-squared  0.320  0.331  0.326 
Notes: (i.)Standard errors in parentheses.
(ii.)Standard errors are clustered by industries.
(iii.) ***, ** and * represent respectively statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
Table 8: Trade Policy and Wages by Region, 2006 
   1  2 
 Urban  Rural 
 Ln (Hr. Wage)  Ln (Hr. Wage) 
 Tariff  -0.00613***  -0.0164*** 
 (0.00111)  (0.00430) 
Non Tariff  -0.0652**  0.164 
 (0.0260)  (0.140) 
AVE Time Exp  -0.00472***  -0.0171*** 
 (0.00157)  (0.00202) 
AVE Time Imp  -0.00729***  -0.00227 
 (0.000722)  (0.00340) 
Public  -0.0548  0.125* 
 (0.0433)  (0.0647) 
Experience  0.0515***  0.0197** 
 (0.00726)  (0.00882) 
Experience2  -0.000604***  -0.000179 
 (0.000195)  (0.000181) 
continued u
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Years of Schooling  0.0421***  0.00774 
 (0.00574)  (0.00782) 
Trade Union  0.386***  0.380** 
 (0.0761)  (0.132) 
Blue Collar  -0.0275  -0.281*** 
 (0.0415)  (0.0827) 
Female  -0.302***  0.112 
 (0.0870)  (0.340) 
Constant  -0.0498  0.654** 
 (0.0991)  (0.229) 
Industry Dummies  YES  YES 
 Observations  777  399 
R-squared  0.403  0.186 
Notes: (i.)Standard errors in parentheses.
(ii.)Standard errors are clustered by industries.
(iii.) ***, ** and * represent respectively statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
Turning to the effect of different barriers on blue vs. white collar 
workers, Table 9 reveals that the former are much more affected by all 
trade barriers than the latter. Non-tariff measures and red tape barriers 
seem to be more onerous than tariffs for unskilled workers as they have 
a higher negative impact on their wages. This is in line with the sectors 
where Egypt has a comparative advantage and that are mainly intensive in 
blue collar jobs. Therefore, when trade is liberalized or facilitated, these 
sectors must expand, demand for blue collar workers will increase and 
consequently their wages.
It is important to notice that tariffs have a negative impact on white 
collar workers. More protected industries should witness less wages with 
respect to more opened ones. The link is as follows: the more the industry 
is open, the more firms will be productive to be able to export and to 
face fierce competition. Therefore they will hire skilled workers and their 
wages should increase. Such a result is consistent with the literature since 
it was stated that the increase in the skill premium was primarily driven 
by skilled-biased technological change after periods of trade liberalization 
and the increased foreign competition to which the trade reform exposed 
domestic producers.
Table 9 shows also that experience and education matter more for white 
collar workers than for blue collared ones. This is explained by the skills 
that are acquired through education and on-the-job-training and that are 
required by highly-qualified occupations (such as managers, clerical, etc.). 
The membership in a trade union increases wages for both of the two 
groups.
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Table 9: Trade Policy and Wages by Qualification, 2006  
   1  2 
 Blue Collar  White Collar 
 Ln (Hr. Wage)  Ln (Hr. Wage) 
 Tariff  -0.0182***  -0.00781** 
 (0.000832)  (0.00318) 
Non Tariff  -0.124**  -0.0403 
 (0.0446)  (0.0549) 
AVE Time Exp  -0.0203***  -0.00137 
 (0.00233)  (0.00158) 
AVE Time Imp  -0.0132***  0.00425 
 (0.000771)  (0.00275) 
Public  0.0962***  -0.0518 
 (0.0277)  (0.0804) 
Experience  0.0300***  0.0570*** 
 (0.00610)  (0.0154) 
Experience2  -0.000302**  -0.000796* 
 (0.000139)  (0.000399) 
Years of Schooling  0.0145***  0.0562*** 
 (0.00426)  (0.0130) 
Trade Union  0.371***  0.316*** 
 (0.0598)  (0.0968) 
Not Cairo  -0.151***  -0.0619 
 (0.0503)  (0.0671) 
Female  -0.147  -0.256 
 (0.173)  (0.165) 
Constant  0.771***  -0.273 
 (0.0869)  (0.291) 
Industry Dummies  YES  YES 
 Observations  824  352 
R-squared  0.222  0.367 
Notes: (i.)Standard errors in parentheses.
(ii.)Standard errors are clustered by industries.
(iii.) ***, ** and * represent respectively statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
Finally, in order to have a better investigation of the effect on skilled 
workers, quantile regressions should be observed since they provide a more 
precise picture of the wage distribution in the sample. Workers in the 
highest quantile (90th) are affected only by tariffs. This confirms the result 
I have obtained for white collar workers that are only impacted by tariffs. 
Workers in the other quantiles are affected by either non-tariff measures 
or red tape costs or both of them. Concerning non-tariff measures, the 
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higher the quantile, the higher the coefficient as they are -0.13, -0.18, -0.25 
and -0.24 for the 10th, 25th, 50th, and 75th quantiles respectively. In addition, 
the time to export is highly significant for the  75th and the 90th quantiles. 
Such a point proves that Egypt has to consider those implicit barriers to 
trade because they have a more important effect on wages. Finally, the 
coefficients of regional dummies are also negative and significant showing 
that an individual working in upper or lower Egypt earns less than the one 
working in Cairo with the same characteristics.
Table 10: Trade Policy and Wages by Quantiles, 2006  
   10th  25th  50th  75th  90th 
 Ln (Hr. Wage)  Ln (Hr. Wage)  Ln (Hr. Wage)  Ln (Hr. Wage)  Ln (Hr. Wage) 
 Tariff  0.00212  0.00120  3.28e-05  -0.00555  -0.0147** 
 (0.00422)  (0.00296)  (0.00407)  (0.00349)  (0.00738) 
Non Tariff  -0.134*  -0.182**  -0.255***  -0.237***  0.0207 
 (0.0737)  (0.0747)  (0.0732)  (0.0627)  (0.136) 
AVE Time Exp  -0.00436  -0.00972**  -0.00976***  -0.0173***  -0.0377*** 
 (0.00570)  (0.00473)  (0.00378)  (0.00474)  (0.00961) 
AVE Time Imp  -0.00564  -0.00134  -0.00599*  -0.00909***  0.00374 
 (0.00503)  (0.00304)  (0.00341)  (0.00273)  (0.00653) 
Public  0.0261  0.0484  -0.000850  -0.00114  0.0870 
 (0.0671)  (0.0640)  (0.0577)  (0.0598)  (0.119) 
Experience  0.0443***  0.0412***  0.0436***  0.0406***  0.0323*** 
 (0.00880)  (0.00683)  (0.00499)  (0.00498)  (0.00889) 
Experience2.  -0.000648***  -0.000540***  -0.000580***  -0.000480***  -0.000224 
 (0.000213)  (0.000181)  (0.000121)  (9.26e-05)  (0.000182) 
Years of School  0.0265***  0.0211***  0.0235***  0.0277***  0.0341*** 
 (0.00697)  (0.00587)  (0.00547)  (0.00568)  (0.00893) 
Trade Union  0.250***  0.318***  0.332***  0.374***  0.392** 
 (0.0725)  (0.0643)  (0.0476)  (0.0494)  (0.200) 
Not Cairo  -0.127**  -0.0700  -0.0434  -0.0728*  -0.253* 
 (0.0505)  (0.0498)  (0.0533)  (0.0397)  (0.132) 
Prod. Work  -0.170*  -0.181***  -0.173***  -0.132**  -0.280* 
 (0.0936)  (0.0653)  (0.0385)  (0.0601)  (0.170) 
Female  -0.325***  -0.309***  -0.365***  -0.290***  -0.213 
 (0.0983)  (0.0892)  (0.0600)  (0.0600)  (0.406) 
Constant  -0.336**  -0.0113  0.385***  0.828***  1.417*** 
 (0.160)  (0.143)  (0.0836)  (0.0987)  (0.360) 
Observations  1176  1176  1176  1176  1176 
Notes: (i.)Standard errors in parentheses.
(ii.) ***, ** and * represent respectively statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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To conclude, it is worth mentioning that non-tariff measures as well as 
red tape barriers have a higher impact than classic tariffs on the wages of 
females, urban workers, and blue collar workers. Therefore, the elimination 
of such barriers will primarily benefit those categories.
Moving to the wage premia, as it is shown in Table 11, tariffs and the time 
to export have a significantly negative effect on the wage premium. The 
time to import is not significant. This implies that increasing protection 
in a particular sector reduces wages in that sector. In other words, more 
trade liberalization and facilitation mean higher wages. Recall that those 
industry wage premia are conditioned on workers characteristics in the 
first stage, therefore, the relationship between different barriers and wage 
premia are not driven by observable differences in workers composition.
Table 11: Trade Policy and Wage Premium, 2006
First step Second step
Ln (Wage) Wage Premium
Public 0.0226 Tariff -0.0117*
(0.0408) (0.00586)
Experience 0.0367*** Time to Imp. -0.000729
(0.00571) (0.00373)
Experience Sq. -0.000403*** Time to Exp. -0.0192**
(0.000131) (0.00761)










Constant 0.189** Constant 0.269*
(0.0898) (0.146)
Observations 1176 Observations 20
R-squared 0.322 R-squared 0.379
 Notes: (i.)Robust standard errors in parentheses.
 (ii.) ***, ** and * represent respectively statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Finally, Table 12 presents the effect on employment. It indicates that 
the share of skilled workers in each industry is inversely related to tariffs 
showing that industries with larger tariff reductions experienced more 
rapid skilled-biased technological change, as measured by the proportion 
of skilled workers. This is consistent with the “defensive innovation”: firms 
in sectors facing intensified import competition look for new methods 
of production that economize on unskilled labor (Thoenig and Verdier, 
2003). Such a result confirms the fact that skilled workers are the most 
negatively affected by trade barriers. By contrast, unskilled workers are 
more affected by the time to export. These findings confirm the previous 
ones regarding blue vs. white collar workers.
Table 12: Trade Policy and Employment, 2006  
 Shr. of 
Emp. 
 Shr. of 
Rural 
 Shr. of 
Urban 
 Shr. of 
Males 
 Shr. of 
Females 
 Shr. of 
Unskilled 
 Shr. of 
Skilled 
 Tariff  -0.00134  -0.00227 -0.000855  -0.00157  0.000285 -0.000733 -0.00309* 
(0.00161) (0.00229) (0.00144) (0.00182)  (0.00218) (0.00177) (0.00161) 
Time to Imp.  0.00196  0.00317  0.00133  0.00181  0.00293  0.00233  0.000863 
(0.00137) (0.00195) (0.00123) (0.00154)  (0.00185) (0.00151) (0.00137) 
Time to Exp. -0.00439* -0.00638*  -0.00338  -0.00410 -0.00643** -0.00503*  -0.00256 
(0.00223) (0.00317) (0.00199) (0.00251)  (0.00300) (0.00245) (0.00223) 
Non-Tariff  0.117**  0.124*  0.113***  0.0977*  0.249***  0.111**  0.135*** 
 (0.0420)  (0.0597)  (0.0375)  (0.0473)  (0.0566)  (0.0461)  (0.0420) 
Constant  0.0516*  0.0634  0.0455*  0.0582*  0.00636  0.0463  0.0669** 
 (0.0272)  (0.0387)  (0.0243)  (0.0307)  (0.0367)  (0.0299)  (0.0272) 
Observations  20  20  20  20  20  20  20 
R-squared  0.425  0.322  0.465  0.276  0.709  0.440  0.434 
Notes: (i.)Robust standard errors in parentheses.
(ii.) ***, ** and * represent respectively statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
Whereas the time to import does not affect any type of employment, 
that to export seems to have a negative and significant effect on all 
workers, females, rural, and unskilled workers. Non-tariff barriers have a 
highly positive and statistically significant effect on employment pointing 
out the fact that such barriers seem to protect workers from foreign 
competition and therefore there employment.
Tables 13, 14 and 15 display some robustness checks for my results. First, 
the wage coming from all jobs is used as a dependant variable instead of 
the one coming from the primary job. It turns out that results remain the 
same (Tables 13) for different segments.
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Table 13: Robustness Check 1: Wages from all Jobs
   All  All  Males  Urban  Rural  Blue Collar 
 White 
Collar 
 Tariff -0.00691***  0.000954 -0.00579*** -0.00623*** -0.0158*** -0.0181***  -0.00748** 
 (0.000770)  (0.00156)  (0.000857)  (0.00110)  (0.00438) (0.000841)  (0.00317) 
Non Tariff  0.0848***  0.0764  -0.00807  -0.0581**  0.152  -0.127***  -0.0448 
 (0.0196)  (0.0475)  (0.0177)  (0.0263)  (0.143)  (0.0426)  (0.0552) 
AVE Time Exp  -0.0116***  -0.00612** -0.00822*** -0.00518*** -0.0164*** -0.0205***  -0.000829 
 (0.00237)  (0.00239)  (0.00178)  (0.00157)  (0.00200)  (0.00232)  (0.00159) 
AVE Time Imp -0.00384***  -0.00322** -0.00530*** -0.00713***  -0.00247 -0.0131***  0.00391 
 (0.000387)  (0.00150)  (0.000457)  (0.000722)  (0.00348) (0.000741)  (0.00270) 
Public  0.0230  0.0222  0.00734  -0.0537  0.129*  0.103***  -0.0548 
 (0.0410)  (0.0425)  (0.0444)  (0.0433)  (0.0656)  (0.0296)  (0.0806) 
Experience  0.0361***  0.0360***  0.0350***  0.0513***  0.0181*  0.0295***  0.0550*** 
 (0.00581)  (0.00562)  (0.00621)  (0.00723)  (0.00909)  (0.00603)  (0.0151) 
Experience2 -0.00039*** -0.00038*** -0.000357** -0.00060***  -0.000147 -0.00029**  -0.000752* 
 (0.000132)  (0.000128)  (0.000136)  (0.000194) (0.000187) (0.000138)  (0.000393) 
Years of School  0.0258***  0.0274***  0.0276***  0.0424***  0.00669  0.0138***  0.0568*** 
 (0.00619)  (0.00603)  (0.00680)  (0.00564)  (0.00793)  (0.00436)  (0.0127) 
Trade Union  0.396***  0.392***  0.375***  0.389***  0.379**  0.371***  0.317*** 
 (0.0511)  (0.0500)  (0.0612)  (0.0756)  (0.136)  (0.0599)  (0.0968) 
Not Cairo  -0.116**  -0.118**  -0.126***    -0.151***  -0.0490 
 (0.0421)  (0.0420)  (0.0424)    (0.0500)  (0.0634) 
Blue Collar  -0.136**  -0.134**  -0.161***  -0.0211  -0.295***   
 (0.0476)  (0.0482)  (0.0559)  (0.0432)  (0.0870)   
Female  -0.166  0.456   -0.302***  0.113  -0.146  -0.257 
 (0.133)  (0.307)   (0.0870)  (0.343)  (0.173)  (0.165) 
Fem*AVE TE   -0.0524***      
  (0.0147)      
Fem*AVE TM   -0.00445      
  (0.0113)      
Female*Tariff   -0.0331***      
  (0.00766)      
Female*NTB   0.549**      
  (0.221)      
Constant  0.301***  0.120  0.327**  -0.0568  0.678**  0.775***  -0.279 
 (0.0991)  (0.104)  (0.130)  (0.100)  (0.239)  (0.0851)  (0.292) 
Ind. Dummies  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Observations  1176  1176  1027  777  399  824  352 
R-squared  0.319  0.331  0.325  0.405  0.184  0.222  0.369 
Notes: (i.) The dependent variable is the total wage coming from all the jobs.
(ii.) Robust standard errors in parentheses.
(iii.) ***, ** and * represent respectively statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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To control for trade shares, sector dummies are suppressed and export 
and import shares in total output are introduced. Table 14 shows that the 
higher the export shares, the higher the negative effect of the ad valorem 
equivalent of the time to export on wages. In addition, the higher the 
import share, the higher the negative effects of tariffs on wages. This 
shows that the most exporting sectors and the most importing ones are 
the most affected by red tape costs and tariffs respectively.
Table 14: Robustness Check 2: Imports and Exports Shares
  All  Males  Urban  Rural White Collar  Blue Collar 
 Ln (Hr. 
Wage) 
 Ln (Hr. 
Wage) 
 Ln (Hr. 
Wage) 
 Ln (Hr. 
Wage) 
 Ln (Hr. 
Wage) 
 Ln (Hr. 
Wage) 
 Tariff  -0.00658**  -0.00635**  -0.00544  -0.0168**  -0.0182** -0.00863** 
 (0.00282)  (0.00274)  (0.00340)  (0.00586)  (0.00723)  (0.00375) 
Non Tariff  0.00198  0.0141  -0.0518  0.0956  0.0615  -0.0436 
 (0.115)  (0.119)  (0.142)  (0.155)  (0.213)  (0.133) 
AVE Time Exp  0.00520  0.00277  0.0208  -0.0272  0.0172  -0.0252 
 (0.0127)  (0.0125)  (0.0151)  (0.0205)  (0.0231)  (0.0205) 
AVE Time Imp  0.00371  0.00326  -9.09e-05  0.0117**  0.00742  0.00638 
 (0.00381)  (0.00342)  (0.00401)  (0.00492)  (0.00949)  (0.00403) 
Public  0.00621  -0.000708  -0.0311  0.0594  -0.0304  0.0657 
 (0.0413)  (0.0442)  (0.0434)  (0.0548)  (0.0797)  (0.0390) 
Experience  0.0363***  0.0357***  0.0508***  0.0200**  0.0551***  0.0298*** 
 (0.00541)  (0.00616)  (0.00703)  (0.00835)  (0.0145)  (0.00611) 
Experience2 -0.000377*** -0.000369** -0.000586***  -0.000182 -0.000758* -0.000284* 
 (0.000126)  (0.000138)  (0.000189) (0.000169) (0.000374) (0.000140) 
Years of Schooling  0.0283***  0.0284***  0.0424***  0.00772  0.0585***  0.0150*** 
 (0.00609)  (0.00663)  (0.00559)  (0.00772)  (0.0132)  (0.00439) 
Trade Union  0.395***  0.376***  0.393***  0.331**  0.315***  0.360*** 
 (0.0477)  (0.0610)  (0.0726)  (0.132)  (0.0956)  (0.0544) 
Exp. Share  1.378***  1.339***  1.676***  0.646  1.889***  0.845** 
 (0.338)  (0.275)  (0.352)  (0.521)  (0.390)  (0.343) 
Imp. Share  0.0712**  0.0728***  0.128***  -0.0499  -0.0437  0.0570 
 (0.0259)  (0.0205)  (0.0210)  (0.0741)  (0.261)  (0.0417) 
Exp. Sh*AVE TE  -0.0931**  -0.0710  -0.190***  0.0969  -0.154  3.08e-05 
 (0.0402)  (0.0424)  (0.0525)  (0.0688)  (0.102)  (0.0776) 
Imp. Sh* NTB  0.0116  0.0201  -0.173  0.396  -0.0716  0.430 
 (0.221)  (0.222)  (0.264)  (0.348)  (0.519)  (0.354) 
Imp. Sh* AVE TM  0.000687  0.00198  -0.00537*  0.00299  5.26e-05  0.00648 
 (0.00332)  (0.00320)  (0.00300)  (0.0126)  (0.0199)  (0.00964) 
Imp. Sh*Tariff  -0.0105**  -0.0107***  -0.0195***  0.00973  -0.00151  -0.0107 
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 (0.00427)  (0.00366)  (0.00357)  (0.0137)  (0.00480)  (0.00855) 
Blue Collar  -0.150***  -0.176***  -0.0611  -0.280***   
 (0.0402)  (0.0471)  (0.0378)  (0.0844)   
Not Cairo  -0.132***  -0.136***    -0.0818  -0.140*** 
 (0.0444)  (0.0443)    (0.0637)  (0.0473) 
Female  0.349   -0.300***  0.101  -0.245  -0.142 
 (0.364)   (0.0863)  (0.333)  (0.163)  (0.171) 
Female*AVE TE  -0.0471**      
 (0.0165)      
Female*AVE TM  -0.00266      
 (0.0116)      
Female*Tariff  -0.0302***      
 (0.00850)      
Female*NTB  0.576**      
 (0.235)      
Constant  0.0571  0.0837  -0.264  0.375  -0.464  0.214 
 (0.202)  (0.207)  (0.178)  (0.261)  (0.340)  (0.165) 
Industry 
Dummies  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
Observations  1176  1026  777  399  352  824 
R-squared  0.318  0.315  0.389  0.165  0.344  0.206 
 Notes: (i.)Robust standard errors in parentheses.
(ii.) ***, ** and * represent respectively statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
Figure 6: Interacting Trade Shares and Trade Barriers: Time to Export
 
Source: Constructed by the author. 
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Figure 7: Interacting Trade Shares and Trade Barriers: Tariffs
 
Source: Constructed by the author.
Finally, skilled and unskilled workers were previously distinguished 
according to their occupation. Here, they are differentiated on the basis 
of their education level.15 As it is shown in Table 15, unskilled workers (or 
blue collar workers) are more affected by all types of barriers.
Table 15: Robustness Check 3: By Education Level
 Low Educ.  High Educ. 
 Ln (Hr. Wage)  Ln (Hr. Wage) 
 Tariff  -0.0141***  -0.00362 
 (0.00107)  (0.00213) 
Non Tariff  -0.109**  0.150 
 (0.0419)  (0.123) 
AVE Time Exp  -0.0109***  -0.00862 
 (0.00268)  (0.00502) 
AVE Time Imp  -0.0108***  0.0174*** 
 (0.000748)  (0.00175) 
15 Skilled workers are those who have higher than intermediate level of education and unskilled ones 
have a lower than intermediate education.
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Public  0.103***  -0.0151 
 (0.0347)  (0.0933) 
Experience  0.0347***  0.0481 
 (0.00579)  (0.0289) 
Experience2  -0.000387***  -0.000464 
 (0.000126)  (0.000813) 
Years of Schooling  0.0206***  0.0741** 
 (0.00611)  (0.0290) 
Trade Union  0.325***  0.460** 
 (0.0545)  (0.179) 
Not Cairo  -0.0834  -0.213* 
 (0.0524)  (0.102) 
Female  -0.123  -0.380** 
 (0.151)  (0.144) 
Industry Dummies  YES  YES 
Constant  0.513***  -0.861 
 (0.0970)  (0.652) 
Observations  974  202 
R-squared  0.246  0.443 
Notes: (i.)Robust standard errors in parentheses.
(ii.) ***, ** and * represent respectively statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels
6. Conclusions
This paper proposes an empirical investigation of the effect of 
different trade barriers on wages in Egypt. The effect of trade barriers 
on wage disparity has been widely discussed at both empirical and public 
policy levels. This debate mainly dealt with traditional tariff barriers. 
Less attention has been attributed to other barriers such as non-tariff 
measures and red tape costs. However, these barriers, and in particular red 
tape costs, are more impeding than tariffs in developing countries. Thus, 
using a microeconomic dataset, I try to assess to what extent different 
trade barriers affected wage disparities and employment in Egypt. These 
disparities are studied in three dimensions: on gender (males vs. females), 
qualification (skilled vs. unskilled), and regional (urban vs. rural workers). 
My main findings show that both non-tariff measures and red tape barriers 
have a higher impact than traditional tariffs on wage disparity. Female, 
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urban, and blue collar workers are more affected by such barriers. Finally, 
when the effects of observable worker characteristics are filtered out, it 
turns out that wage premia are negatively affected by all trade barriers.
From a policymaking standpoint, such a study points out to some 
crucial implications. First, since barriers associated with trade facilitation 
are a deadweight loss, all agents and sectors should gain from such a 
process. That is why developing countries must pursue reforms in order 
to eliminate non-official (border-related procedures) barriers that are less 
transparent. Second, since administrative barriers have a higher adverse 
effect on wage disparity than traditional tariffs, the government of 
Egypt should focus on trade facilitation rather than trade liberalization 
to boost trade, and consequently production, labor demand, and wages. 
Third, as Egypt has a comparative advantage in sectors that are highly 
intensive in blue collar workers, the government must put in place a policy 
aiming at liberalizing and developing these sectors in order to generate 
new employment opportunities and reducing unemployment among 
them. Providing technical training for these workers is crucial to increase 
their productivity in order to better face the fierce competition once the 
economy is more exposed to the rest of the world. Finally, for females in 
particular, since they are working in sectors characterized by a comparative 
advantage, the trade facilitation and liberalization of these sectors is likely 
to increase female employment.
The findings of this study suggest three potential areas for future 
research. First, it is worth mentioning that developing a theoretical model 
would be crucial in providing better insights into the trade facilitation 
effects on wage inequality. Moreover, it would be interesting to apply 
the same analysis for services and agriculture given the importance of 
the former and the high protection of the latter in Egypt. Last but not 
least, in order to determine the evolution of trade policy in Egypt, the 
panel dimension should be used. Clearly, this can be done once data for 
administrative and non-tariff barriers are available.
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